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Abstract—The detection of BGP prefix hijacking attacks has
been the focus of research for more than a decade. However, state-
of-the-art techniques fall short of detecting more elaborate types
of attack. To study such attacks, we devise a novel formalization
of Internet routing, and apply this model to routing anomalies in
order to establish a comprehensive attacker model. We use this
model to precisely classify attacks and to evaluate their impact
and detectability. We analyze the eligibility of attack tactics that
suit an attacker’s goals and demonstrate that related work mostly
focuses on less impactful kinds of attacks.
We further propose, implement and test the Hijacking Event
Analysis Program (HEAP), a new approach to investigate hijack-
ing alarms. Our approach is designed to seamlessly integrate
with previous work in order to reduce the high rates of false
alarms inherent to these techniques. We leverage several unique
data sources that can reliably disprove malicious intent. First, we
make use of an Internet Routing Registry to derive business or
organisational relationships between the parties involved in an
event. Second, we use a topology-based reasoning algorithm to
rule out events caused by legitimate operational practice. Finally,
we use Internet-wide network scans to identify SSL/TLS-enabled
hosts, which helps to identify non-malicious events by comparing
public keys prior to and during an event. In our evaluation, we
prove the effectiveness of our approach, and show that day-to-
day routing anomalies are harmless for the most part. More
importantly, we use HEAP to assess the validity of publicly
reported alarms. We invite researchers to interface with HEAP
in order to cross-check and narrow down their hijacking alerts.
Index Terms—BGP hijacking, IRR analysis, SSL/TLS mea-
surements, routing model
I. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is today’s standard
for exchanging network routes between autonomous systems
(ASes). Despite being vital to forward traffic on the Internet,
BGP does not feature security mechanisms to validate route
updates. Reports such as [1], [2] have shown that attacks
on BGP do occur and pose a real threat. Systems like S-
BGP [3] and RPKI [4] have been developed to add integrity
protection and origin authentication to BGP. However, due to
the considerable resources needed to deploy them, they are not
widely used. Consequently, a number of mechanisms to detect
routing attacks have been proposed [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
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Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we devise
a novel formalization of Internet routing based on concepts
from formal languages. With this model, attacks on BGP can
be precisely formulated and classified according to their effect
on the global routing table. This leads us to a comprehensive
attacker model. We further discuss the motivation behind
routing attacks and learn that common prefix hijacking offers
no real benefit for an attacker apart from being destructive
to the victim. More elaborate types of attacks aim to support
sustained malicious activity with benefits for an attacker such
as a chance to abuse networks to stage other attacks, send
unsolicited email, or to impersonate a victim. We show that
state-of-the-art detection techniques are not fully capable of
dealing with the full spectrum of attacks. Surprisingly, most
related work focuses on the less impactful attacks, and either
fully neglects more effective and sustainable variants, or is of
limited use due to a high rate of false positives.
In the second part of this paper, we present a scheme to
assess the validity of generic hijacking alarms. This Hijacking
Event Analysis Program (HEAP) is introduced as an automated
system to reason about elaborate routing attacks. We leverage a
carefully selected set of filters proposed in previous work [11],
[12]. With HEAP, we strive to reliably identify legitimate
events, i.e. hijacking alarms that are in fact false positives. To
this end, we provide 1) administrative assurance obtained from
Internet Routing Registries, 2) operational assurance based on
insights into common routing practices, and 3) cryptographic
assurance gained by comprehensive SSL/TLS measurements.
We evaluate HEAP for a set of common routing anomalies,
so-called subMOAS conflicts, observed in BGP over the
period of one month. Although a coarse approximation of
real alarms, we learn that our system is highly effective in
identifying legitimate events. We complement our findings
with an instructive case study on routing anomalies for popular
networks, which host the top one million web sites. Attackers
have much interest to launch malicious activities from such
networks as they can profit from their good reputation. We
show that HEAP naturally benefits from this circumstance and
yields very good results: We are able to rule out attacks for
more than 80% of corresponding routing anomalies.
By studying day-to-day anomalies without intrinsic evi-
dence for an attack, we establish a base line for our le-
gitimization capabilities. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
HEAP, we further apply our assessment scheme to publicly
reported hijacking alarms and learn that even such a set of
highly suspicious events still contains nearly 10% of false
positives. We find our results highly encouraging and conclude
that HEAP is suitable to assess a variety of hijacking alarms,
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including those of related work that inherently exhibit high
rates of false positives. Hence, we call on researchers to
continuously feed our system with their conjectural alarms.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II presents our formalized attacker model. We discuss and
assess related work in Section III. Our methodology for HEAP
is presented in Section IV, followed by an evaluation of the
approach in Section V.
II. A COMPREHENSIVE ATTACKER MODEL
We present a novel formalization of Internet routing based
on concepts of formal languages. With this model, routing
anomalies can be precisely expressed, classified and further
assessed with respect to impact and detectability. Previous
work mostly relies on informal and often inconsistent defini-
tions. We believe that our routing model can improve on this
situation. It may serve as a well-founded basis for a broad
spectrum of future analyses on Internet routing.
A. Formalization of Internet Routing
As per definition, a formal language is a set of strings
of symbols constrained by specific rules. Analagous to that,
Internet routing can be represented as the set L of all active
BGP routes in the global routing system, i.e. the set of AS
paths from all vantage points towards all advertised IP prefixes.
In this model, a routing attack is then defined by an attacker
extending L by forged routes.
1) Preliminaries: Let ΣAS be the set of all ASes, Π the
set of all IP addresses, p ⊂ Π an IP prefix, and p′ ⊂ p a more
specific prefix of p. Let further be (w, p) ∈ Σ∗AS ×Π a route
with an AS path w ∈ Σ∗AS , i.e. an arbitrary concatenation of
ASes, to a prefix p ∈ Π, in the following denoted r = wp.
Then, we define L ⊂ Σ∗AS×Π as the set of active routes to all
advertised prefixes in the global routing system, i.e. the set of
all observable routes. L(p) ⊂ L denotes the subset of routes
to a given prefix p ⊂ Π, such that
L(p) = {wuop ∈ L | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ ΣAS ; o ∈ ΣAS}
with w being an AS subpath and u the upstream AS of the
origin AS o. For a given route r and a subprefix p′ ⊂ p, we
postulate r ∈ L(p)⇒ r ∈ L(p′) as a corollary, since routes to
less specific prefixes also cover more specific prefixes. Note
that the converse is false. Further, LP ⊂ L denotes the set
of all observable routes from a set of observation points P ⊂
ΣAS . Πo denotes the set of IP addresses advertised by an AS
o ∈ ΣAS , i.e. the union of its advertised prefixes. Then, the
set of origin ASes for a prefix p ⊂ Π is given by
O(p) = {o ∈ ΣAS | p ⊂ Πo} .
Consistently, the set of origin ASes O(p′) for a subprefix p′ ⊂
p comprises the origin ASes for less specific prefixes such that
O(p′) = {o ∈ ΣAS | p′ ⊂ Πo} =
⋃
p ⊇ p′
O(p) ,
since these ASes effectively originate routes to the particular
network p′. Note again that the converse is false. The set of
upstream AS neighbors for an AS o ∈ ΣAS is given by
U(o) = {u ∈ ΣAS | wuop ∈ L such that w ∈ Σ∗AS ; p ⊂ Πo}.
Due to best path selection in BGP, the number of routes from
an observation point s ∈ ΣAS to a particular prefix p ⊂ Π
is generally bound by the number of neighboring ASes of s,
i.e. |Ls(p)| ≤ |U(s)| holds. In the followiong, we reuse the
unary operator | . | to indicate the number of routes in a set
O ⊆ L, the length of a route r ∈ L or a subpath w ∈ Σ∗AS ,
and the number of ASes in a set S ⊆ ΣAS .
2) Definition of Routing Attacks: We define routing attacks
as an attacker extending the global set of BGP routes L by
forged routes F . Their purpose is to manipulate existing routes
in order to re-route traffic flows or to take over a victim’s In-
ternet resources. In general, such incidents are called hijacking
attacks. Typically, these attacks lead to topological changes in
the Internet, which can be observed by neutral BGP speakers.
Our attacker is assumed to be capable of injecting arbitrary
BGP messages into the global routing system, i.e. he operates
a BGP router and maintains a BGP session to at least one
upstream provider. We assume that the attacker is not hindered
by local filters or other validation mechanisms employed by
his upstream provider. Instead, the upstream AS indifferently
redistributes all update messages to its peers, which thus may
propagate throughout the Internet. An observation point shall
be in place to monitor the propagation of BGP messages. It is
worth mentioning that data packets do not necessarily traverse
all ASes in a given path, since an attacker may craft BGP
messages with a forged AS path. Further, route updates with
less attractive paths may not reach a particular observation
point due to best path selection in BGP. Without loss of
generality, an omnipresent observation pointto observe the set
of all active routes L is assumed for the following definitions.
In the following, we denote an attacker’s AS a ∈ ΣAS and
his victim’s AS v ∈ ΣAS . Further, a victim’s prefix is given by
pv ⊂ Πv . Then, a generic routing attack on pv is defined by
an attacker injecting forged routes Fa into the routing system,
such that the altered set of globally visible routes Lˆ(p′v) is
given by
Lˆ(p′v) = L(pv) ∪ Fa(p′v) with p′v ⊆ pv .
3) Impact Analysis: In BGP, the impact of a hijacking
attack generally depends on a best path selection process.
In particular, shorter AS paths are preferred over longer
ones, although policy-induced exceptions on a case-by-case
basis may exist. With respect to packet forwarding, routes
to longer IP prefixes prevail. Assuming the ambition to
forge globally accepted routes, an attacker thus succeeds if
his routes towards a victim’s network are considered best
by a vast majority of Internet participants. In practice, an
attacker needs to ensure that his bogus routes Fa(p′v) are either
1) unrivaled in terms of competitive routes, i.e. |L(p′v)| = 0,
2) shortest from a global perspective, i.e.
∀r ∈ L(p′v), ra ∈ Fa(p′v) : |ra| < |r|, or
3) more specific than all others, i.e.
∀p′′v ⊆ p′v ⊂ pv : L(p′′v) = L(p′v) = L(pv).
As a consequence, the prospects of identifying an attack
naturally depend on the significance of topological changes
in Lˆ, i.e. on abnormal changes to the sets of origin ASes Oˆ
and upstream ASes Uˆ for a victim’s network.
legitimate BGP path
invalid prefix origin
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Fig. 1: Origin relocation attacks in BGP.
B. Classification of Attacks
BGP-based attacks aim to inject falsified protocol messages
into the global routing system, which may lead to topological
changes in the Internet. Depending on the characteristics of
such changes, hijacking attacks can be classified into several
subtypes with differing tactical value.
1) Examples: In addition to the formalized model, the
topology in Figure 1 is used to exemplify different types
of attacks. Mallory thereby denotes an attacker, and her
autonomous system respectively. Oscar and Paul are Mallory’s
upstream providers who do not validate BGP messages. The
observation point OP receives route updates that propagate
through the Internet, which are herein after simplified to the
topology-relevant attributes of BGP messages, namely the IP
prefix, also called NLRI, and the AS path, refered to as
AS_PATH. The following expression illustrates such an update
observed at OP:
OP: ASK∗ ← Carol ← Alice  P legitimate
Originating () at Alice, a route update for the prefix
P traverses Carol and a series of K ASes ASK∗ to reach
the observation point OP. For the sake of clarity, temporary
convergence effects within BGP are ignored. Alice serves as a
victim for different kinds of attacks, Carol and Dave provide
upstream connectivity for Alice.
2) Hijacking Attacks in Practice: Given a standard router
with an already established point-to-point IP connection to
the router of an upstream provider, it is surprisingly easy to
participate in BGP and to originate an IP prefix. Consider the
following BGP configuration of Alice’s router named rtr,
which actually represents a minimal working example:
rtr(config)# router bgp alice
rtr(config-router)# neighbor X.X.X.X remote-as carol
rtr(config-router)# network 10.1.0.0/16
In this example, Alice opens a BGP session to her neighbor
router X.X.X.X, which is operated by Carol, and advertises
direct reachability of 10.1.0.0/16. This information will
be redistributed by Carol to her neighbors, and may eventually
propagate to all BGP routers connected to the Internet. It
is as easy for an attacker to originate arbitrary IP prefixes,
irrespectively of whether legitimate routes to these IP prefixes
already exist. Depending on the specifics of the attacker’s
approach, the original routes will be partially or entirely
overridden in the global routing system. Hence, this type of
attack results in an origin relocation of a victim’s network.
3) Prefix Hijacking: The most basic form of origin reloca-
tion attacks is prefix hijacking. An attacker thereby originates a
victim’s prefix at his own AS, in principle in the same way as
illustrated above. The resulting forged routes compete with the
victim’s concurrent announcements. The following definition
formulates this attack scenario:
Lˆ(pv) = {wuvpv | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ U(v)} ∪ legitimate
{wuapv | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ U(a)} forged
with Oˆ(pv) = O(pv) ∪ {a}
and Uˆ(v) = U(v)
The set of origin ASes Oˆ(pv) for the prefix pv now comprises
two ASes, while the set of the victim’s upstream ASes Uˆ(v)
remains unchanged. In literature, a situation with |O(p)| > 1
is often called a multi-origin AS (MOAS). Given the exemplary
topology in Figure 1, Mallory may craft a BGP update
message as listed below. At the same time, legitimate paths
advertised by Alice are present in the global routing table.
OP : ASK∗ ← Carol ← Alice  10.1.0.0/16 legitimate
OP : ASL∗ ← Dave ← Alice  10.1.0.0/16 legitimate
OP : ASM∗ ← Oscar ← Mallory  10.1.0.0/16 forged
Example II.1: Prefix Hijacking.
As shorter AS paths are generally preferred over longer
ones, the attack is likely to succeed for observation points
s where M < min(K,L) holds, and for
{s ∈ ΣAS | ∀wvpv ∈ Ls(pv) ∃ wapv ∈ Fa(pv) : |wa| < |wv|}
respectively. However, it is safe to assume that clients that are
topologically close to Carol or Dave still reach the victim
Alice, since shorter legitimate routes take precedence. The
Internet thus decomposes into two disjoint parts: one part that
is affected by the forged announcement, in literature often
called the poisoned part, and one that remains unaffected.
4) Subprefix Hijacking: To overcome the limited impact
inherent to prefix hijacking, an attacker can leverage longest
prefix matching in IP routing with so-called subprefix hijack-
ing. To this end, the attacker originates a subprefix p′v ⊂ pv
at his AS, thereby injecting a new set of routes Fa(p′v) into
the global routing system as given by:
Lˆ(pv) = {wuvpv | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ U(v)} ∪ legitimate
{wuap′v | w ∈ Σ∗AS ; u ∈ U(a)} forged
with Oˆ(pv) = O(pv), Oˆ(p
′
v) = O(pv) ∪ {a}
and Uˆ(v) = U(v)
Subprefix hijacking attacks generally have global impact, since
routes to the more specific prefix p′ ⊂ p dominate. Such
incidents with |O(p)| > 0 and |O(p′) \ O(p)| > 0 are called
subprefix multi-origin AS (subMOAS).
Note that the victim might readily advertise routes to a pre-
fix and a corresponding subprefix concurrently to the attacker’s
subprefix route, i.e. condition 3) in Subsection II-A3 does not
hold since L(pv) ⊂ L(p′v). In this case, the event can also
be considered a MOAS event. Otherwise, it is called a strict
subMOAS, and subprefix hijacking respectively. We assume
this variant in the following. While virtually all Internet
participants are affected by strict subprefix hijacking, it may
be tempting to conclude that only part of the victim’s network,
i.e. subprefixes, can be taken over. As a matter of fact, this
is not the case. An attacker can easily craft multiple update
messages such that the set of forged routes Fa(pv) fully covers
the prefix pv with more specific routes:
Fa(pv) =
⋃
p′v∈Π
Fa(p′v) such that pv =
⋃
p′v .
With respect to Figure 1, Mallory could thus inject the
following BGP routes:
OP : ASK∗ ← Carol ← Alice  10.1.0.0/16 legitimate
OP : ASL∗ ← Dave ← Alice  10.1.0.0/16 legitimate
OP : ASM∗ ← Oscar ← Mallory  10.1.0.0/17 forged
OP : ASM∗ ← Oscar ← Mallory  10.1.128.0/17 forged
Example II.2: Subrefix Hijacking.
By advertising a victim’s network with BGP updates split up
into multiple longer prefixes, as given by 10.1.0.0/17 and
10.1.128.0/17 in the example above, subprefix hijacking
can be as extensive as regular prefix hijacking, with the
advantage of globally preferred routes at the same time.
Notwithstanding this possibility, an attacker might be satisfied
with hijacking individual subnets of high value only.
5) Other Types of Attack: Origin relocation attacks as
discussed above lead to noticeable changes in the set of origins
for a victim’s prefix. In contrast, route diversion attacks aim
at the manipulation of AS paths towards a victim. In its basic
form, an attacker hijacks a victim’s prefixes and its AS, which
effectively disguises the attack by hiding the attacker’s own
AS. Moreover, tailored attacks can be derived to impersonate
a victim from an administrative point of view by stealthily
hijacking abandoned Internet resources. We have studied such
hidden takeover attacks in great detail in previous work [2],
[13]. An even more sophisticated attack based on AS path
manipulation aims at stealthily intercepting a victim’s traffic
while maintaining the victim’s connectivity. Such man-in-the-
middle attacks require a stable backhaul link from the attacker
to the victim to forward eavesdropped packets. Interestingly,
BGP itself, and its loop prevention mechanism respectively,
can be leveraged to accomplish this task. Our routing model
allows to formalize and study these types of attacks. For this
paper, however, we consider them beyond scope.
C. Motivation behind Hijacking Attacks
Hijacking attacks may serve a variety of purposes, which
can be divided into destructive and abusive variants. An
obvious intent is to inflict damage to a victim’s operations
by disrupting network connectivity, which is often called
blackholing in literature. Furthermore, hijacked networks can
be abused for malicious short-term activities, for instance to
launch a fast, temporary, and massive spam campaign. Abusive
actions may aim at hosting illegal services, like phishing web
sites, or serve to establish a stable base of operations for
subsequent attacks, e.g. to command botnets from a safe-house
network. More sophisticated attacks aim at compromising
a victim’s reputation by carrying out illicit actions. Lastly,
attacks can be tailored to break confidentiality or integrity of
a particular victim’s communications by means of interception.
Prefix hijacking attacks partially disrupt a victim’s connec-
tivity, but are of limited use in other respects, like hosting
malicious services, since a significant part of the Internet
might still prefer the victim’s routes. In contrast, subprefix
hijacking attacks are capable of breaking communications
entirely, i.e. all hosts inside the victim’s network become
globally unreachable. Hence, this type of attack is also useful
for launching illegal operations from a hijacked network, and
an important element for more sophisticated attacks like AS
hijacking or man-in-the-middle interception. Having no real-
world benefit apart from partially disconnecting a victim’s
hosts from the Internet, it is surprising to see that state-of-
the-art focuses primarily on prefix hijacking.
III. RELATED WORK
There is a large body of literature on the detection of
BGP-based routing attacks. Corresponding techniques can be
divided into control-plane and data-plane techniques, with
hybrid approaches emerging recently.
A. State-of-the-art Detection
Possibly the first attempt to detect hijacking attacks was
presented with PHAS [5]. It is a control-plane technique fo-
cusing exclusively on reporting MOAS conflicts. In an effort to
reduce high rates of false positives, PHAS utilizes an adaptive
time-window that prevents recurring alerts. The authors of
[6] provide further heuristics to assess MOAS conflicts with
respect to compliance with economy-based routing policies.
Careful tuning of heuristic parameters is necessary to yield
suitable detection results. The approach thus tends to reduce
false alarms at the cost of an increased rate of false nega-
tives. LOCK [14] offers to pinpoint attackers in the AS-level
topology. The Buddyguard system [15] uses a learning-based
approach to detect abnormal routing changes. The creators of
BGPmon.net [16] provide MOAS and subMOAS alarms in
real-time, but do not publish details about their methodology.
In [7], a light-weight distributed measurement scheme
(LWDS) is proposed. This data-plane technique is based on the
assumption that path measurements yield stable path lengths
for a majority of networks. Major violations of this conjecture
hint at a suspicious change in network location if a set of
reference points close to this network remains unaffected. Due
to its dependency on suitable vantage points and reference
nodes, it is difficult to deploy the scheme on a larger scale.
A comparable technique that leverages latency measurements
from multiple vantage points is proposed in [17]. The Stro-
beLight system [18] detects hijacking attacks in a similar way,
though on a per-operator basis only. A more popular operator-
centric approach is given with iSpy [8]. By carrying out data-
plane measurements from an operator’s network to major
transit ASes, attacks are detected based on specific outage
patterns that reflect the partitioning of the Internet into affected
and unaffected parts (refer to Subsection II-B3). iSpy cannot
Prefix Subprefix
Applicability
Public
Hijacking Hijacking Interface
control-plane detection
PHAS [5] + o o (operator-level) no
Bogus Routes [6] + o + (global scale) no
BGPmon.net [16] x x + (global scale) yes
data-plane detection
LWDS [7] + + – (incident-level) no
iSpy [8] + – o (operator-level) no
hybrid techniques
Fingerprints [9] + o + (global scale) no
Argus [10] + o + (global scale) yes
HEAP (our system) o ++ + (global scale) yes
++/+ practical usefulness o theoretic applicability
– not supported x no details published
TABLE I: Comparison of popular state-of-the-art detection systems.
differentiate between subprefix hijacking and temporary link
failures or congestion near the victim’s network.
One of the first hijacking detection systems to include
both passive and active measurements is a fingerprint-based
approach [9]. This system utilizes a monitoring scheme for
BGP combined with active measurements to identify two
disjoint parts of the Internet as outlined above. For subprefix
hijacking, where no such partitioning occurs (see Subsec-
tion II-B4), several heuristics are proposed. A similar approach
is realized with the Argus system [10]. This framework detects
anomalies in BGP and confirms hijacking attacks by carrying
out measurements from public looking glasses to identify a
poisoned part of the Internet. The authors of [19] extend the
set of active scans, while [20] proposes additional types of
fingerprints. A complementary approach to assess immediate
effects of control-plane anomalies onto the data-plane is to
perform measurements during and after an event [21].
B. Assessment and Comparison
Looking at Table I, it is surprising to see that related work
concentrates its effort on the detection of prefix hijacking
attacks, despite the fact that this kind of attack is of very
limited use for an attacker in practice. As a matter of fact,
subprefix hijacking attacks offer more useful means for a
broader area of operations, but are mostly neglected in state-
of-the-art techniques. HEAP, our own contribution, aims to
improve on this situation by providing reliable means to assess
alarms relating to this specific type of attack.
IV. HEAP: A REAL-TIME FRAMEWORK
We propose a novel Hijacking Event Analysis Program
(HEAP) to reliably assess hijacking alarms. We combine
techniques from prior work [11], [12] to identify incidents
with legitimate cause. Our goal is not to develop a new
alarm system. Instead, HEAP is designed to receive input from
available detection systems to reduce their rate of false alarms.
A. System Architecture
HEAP leverages three distinct data sources to assess hi-
jacking events. Our main assumption here is that an attacker is
capable to hijack networks in BGP, but cannot alter orthogonal
remaining
alarms
legitimate events
EXTERNAL INPUT
from state-of-the-art 
detection systems
BENIGN
TOPOLOGY 
ANALYSISBGP
IRR REGISTRY 
INFERENCE
SSL/TLS 
SCANS
H
E
A
P
Fig. 2: The Hijacking Event Analysis Program (HEAP).
data sources that relate to the operation of hijacked networks.
Hence, we are able to rule out an attack if these data sources
legitimize a suspicious routing anomaly. First, Internet Routing
Registries (IRR) are utilized to infer legitimate business rela-
tionships between an attacker and his alleged victim. Second,
a topological analysis is carried out in order to identify benign
anomalies resulting from common operational practices. And
lastly, SSL/TLS measurements yield cryptographic assurance
that traffic to a supposedly hijacked network is still routed to
the alleged victim.
Figure 2 illustrates the main workflow within HEAP. Given
external alarms fed into the system, legitimate events are
identified and eliminated as false positives based on the afore-
mentioned data sources. Note that the SSL/TLS component
needs a tight coupling to external systems that provide us
with alarms since corresponding scans have to be carried out
in response to the input received. The remaining events are
highly suspicious indications for an attack, even if we take into
account that we cannot make further assumptions about their
nature. This is for two reasons: 1) the input source already
provides potential hijacking candidates, and 2) none of our
filter techniques yields evidence for a legitimate cause. In the
following, we will show that this is indeed improbable for
benign events. The remaining alarms lend themselves well to
manual inspection, with a rich set of background information
readily available from the individual analysis steps.
B. Filtering Methodology
All filters applied by HEAP are executed concurrently.
HEAP is easily extensible, i.e. additional filters can be in-
corporated without difficulty. Three independent techniques to
eliminate legitimate alarms have been implemented so far.
1) Utilizing IRR Databases: Regional Internet Registrars
(RIRs) maintain so-called Internet Routing Registries (IRR),
i.e. databases that contain information pertaining to the man-
agement of Internet resources. A recent study [22] matched
prefixes and ASes observed in BGP and IRRs by looking for
appropriate database objects. We provide a more generalized
set of inference rules to identify benign routing events, which
take into account multiple prefix origins observed in BGP
as well as complex relationships between affected prefixes
and suspicious ASes. The fundamental assumption behind our
approach is that an attacker does not have the credentials
to change an IRR database in order to cover his attack.
To disprove an attack, we accordingly look for legitimizing
AfriNIC APNIC 1ARIN LACNIC RIPE
instance nodes relations nodes relations nodes relations nodes relations nodes relations
MNTNER 2,624 — 20,129 — n/a — n/a — 53,670 —
←maintained_by– [*] — 133,186 — 1,919,397 — n/a — n/a — 5,620,385
ORGANISATION 1,877 — n/a — 2,976,707 — n/a — 90,102 —
←org– [*] — 32,476 — n/a — 3,536,502 — n/a — 249,319
AUT-NUM 1,239 — 9,485 — 24,939 — 5,193 — 29,206 —
←origin– ROUTE — 464 — 216,865 — 2583,296 — n/a — 279,532
←import– AUT-NUM — 6 — 10,734 — n/a — n/a — 228,509
INETNUM 85,672 — 924,584 — 2,910,623 — 342,104 — 3,995,522 —
ROUTE 443 — 97,858 — 2600,940 — n/a — 267,216 —
TABLE II: Data stored in our graph database. August, 2015.
1 ARIN’s object identifiers can be directly mapped to RIPE’s schema (e.g. ASHandle → AUT-NUM).
2 Implicitly given in ARIN’s INETNUM objects (via OriginAS attributes).
maintained_by
n:n
MNTNER
ROUTE AUT-NUMINETNUM
ORGANI-
SATION
origin
n:1
maps_to
n:n
import
n:n
Fig. 3: Relevant data objects and relations in IRR databases.
database relations between the entities involved in a hijacking
alarm, e.g. for a common organisation referenced by two
ASes. To this end, we download and evaluate snapshots of the
IRR databases, which are provided by RIRs on a daily basis.
We use a graph database to store the extracted information
using the schema presented in Table II and track all changes
over time. Note that IRR databases are updated by individual
resource holders and can thus be outdated or even hold
conflicting information. Our filter accounts for this by strictly
searching for legitimizing relationships without drawing any
conclusions in their absence.
To assess a given hijacking alarm, we map the affected AS
numbers and prefixes to resource objects, i.e. graph nodes,
in our graph database. We then traverse the graph along a
path of legitimizing relations that document a right to use,
which are given by AUT-NUM and INETNUM objects linked
by import, origin, maintained_by or org relations. We look for
such paths between a) two affected ASes, or b) a prefix and its
origin AS. If we succeed with a), we can infer a valid business
relationship between the victim and the suspected attacker. If
we succeed with b), the suspected attacker holds ownership
rights for the prefix and is thus authorized to originate the
prefix from his AS. Compared to our previous work [11],
we extended this filter to support the IRR databases provided
by all five RIRs. Note that we transform all IRR databases
into the RIPE data model as presented in Figure 3, since it
is most consistent and represents a superset of all available
information. In fact, AfriNIC and APNIC already store their
data in a similar format and can thus be directly processed by
our filter. LACNIC and ARIN utilize their own data models,
which can be converted in spite of some missing data points.
RIPE-based IRR databases model access rights with the help
of MNTNER objects. Only maintainers with valid credentials
can modify or delete objects. For any object, this is expressed
by adding a maintained_by reference pointing to the respective
MNTNER object. ORGANISATION objects are mainly used
to provide administrative contact details. For privacy reasons,
most IRR database snapshots do not include details, but unique
references to these objects are preserved. INETNUM objects
document allocated or assigned IPv4 prefixes managed by
the respective RIR. AUT-NUM objects represent AS numbers
and may be referenced as the origin of ROUTE objects. Such
ROUTE objects are created by resource holders and are used
to document or confirm intended prefix announcements by
specific ASes. To create a ROUTE object, the resource holder
needs to provide valid credentials for the respective INETNUM
and AUT-NUM objects. A corresponding maps_to relation is
derived by our parsing algorithm, as is the case with import
relations deduced from free-text description fields, which are
often used to model routing policies in the so-called Routing
Policy Specification Language (RPSL). When resources are
deleted from a database, RPSL definitions may still reference
(now) non-existing ASes. We account for this by tracking such
orphaned import relations.
Table II provides further details on selected objects that
are relevant to our approach. Our combined database holds
more than 15 million nodes and 45 million relations extracted
from the five individual IRR databases. Entries marked with
n/a are not available in the respective database snapshots. For
the RIPE database, for instance, we can see that less than
55,000 MNTNER objects share more than 5 million incoming
maintained_by references. Although optional, roughly 90,000
ORGANISATION objects are referenced by 250,000 other
objects. About 280,000 ROUTE objects bind prefix announce-
ments to less than 30,000 AUT-NUM objects. Furthermore,
these AUT-NUM objects document nearly 230,000 import rout-
ing policies. We will see that this rich information allows our
filter to be highly effective—except in the case of LACNIC,
where none of the necessary cross-referencing objects are
provided in the daily database snapshots.
2) Topology Reasoning: The next filter to legitimize rout-
ing anomalies is a topology-based reasoning algorithm. The
key idea is that an attacker is unlikely to hijack his own
upstream provider. This assumption is based on the fact that
the attacker’s malicious BGP updates need to propagate via
this upstream provider, who could simply counter an attack
by filtering them out. As a consequence, we can rule out an
attack if the suspected attacker resides in the downstream AS
path of his victim.
To identify such benign anomalies, we utilize BGP collec-
tors to extract all AS paths that lead to the affected prefixes and
ASes respectively. If we do not find any AS path that contains
both the attacker’s and the victim’s AS, we cannot draw any
further conclusions. The same is true for AS paths in which
the attacker is located upstream of his victim. In contrast, we
can infer a legitimate cause of the anomaly if the attacker
is actually located downstream of the victim, i.e. if we find
a particular AS path in which the victim’s AS precedes the
attacker’s AS. In this case, we can rule out malicious intent.
Such benign situations might occur, for instance, if smaller
organizations obtain Internet connectivity and an IP prefix
from a larger carrier. Other reasons can be static routes invisi-
ble to BGP, imperfect multihoming setups, or even misconfig-
uration. In our evaluation, we will see that a significant part
of day-to-day routing anomalies is caused by such topological
constellations.
3) Cryptographic Assurance with SSL/TLS: We use a final
strong filter that is based on our regular Internet-wide scans of
SSL/TLS protocols (refer to [23] for further details). For any
given hijacking alarm concerning a certain IP prefix, we verify
if affected SSL/TLS hosts present the same public key before
and during the event. We make the assumption that an attacker
cannot gain access to the private keys of a victim’s hosts,
and thus cannot perform successful SSL/TLS handshakes. We
conclude that such cases cannot be attacks.
A prerequisite for this filter is a ground truth scan to obtain
a known-correct mapping from IP addresses to public keys
that are used on corresponding machines. Given such a ground
truth data set, we can carry out validation scans to hosts in
a prefix that relates to a hijacking alarm and compare the
retrieved public keys. Note that it is imperative for these scans
to be executed in a timely manner, i.e. we need to compare
public keys during the life time of an event. A tight coupling
to the alarming system is dispensable if we can retroactively
ascertain that an event lasted for the entire duration of a
corresponding scan. Since our system is designed to assess
subprefix hijacking attacks, which affect the Internet as a
whole (refer to Subsection II-A3), the vantage point for our
SSL/TLS measurements can be chosen freely. For this paper,
we employed a scanning machine hosted at our university in
Munich (AS56357).
Compared to our previous work [11], we greatly extended
the ground truth scans to a variety of popular SSL/TLS-based
protocols. Table III shows all scans that were carried out
for this work. In many cases, we scanned for both TLS and
STARTTLS, a common extension to network protocols that
allows for opportunistic use of TLS. It is instructive to see
that the use of TLS varies greatly between application-layer
protocols. An open, dedicated port does not imply support for
TLS per se. Due to the marginal contributions that our scans of
XMPPS and IRCs provided, we have since stopped scanning
these protocols.
port time port open handshake in %
Implicit SSL/TLS 27d 72,546,563 38,146,816 52.58%
HTTPS 443 10d 42,676,912 27,252,853 63.85%
SMTPS 465 2d 7,234,817 3,437,382 47.51%
IMAPS 993 3d 6,297,805 4,121,108 65.43%
POP3S 995 3d 5,186,724 2,797,300 53.93%
FTPS 990 2d 2,657,680 344,400 12.95%
LDAPS 636 2d 2,273,771 112,978 4.96%
XMPPS/CLIENT 5223 2d 2,223,994 70,441 3.16%
XMPPS/SERVER 5270 1d 2,046,204 1,693 0.08%
IRCS 6697 2d 1,948,656 8,661 0.44%
Explicit SSL/TLS 9d 51,768,705 18,316,920 35.38%
FTP/STARTTLS 21 2d 14,493,966 2,939,048 20.27%
SMTP/STARTTLS 25 2d 12,488,000 3,848,843 30.82%
POP3/STARTTLS 110 1d 8,930,688 4,074,211 45.62%
IMAP/STARTTLS 143 2d 8,006,617 4,076,809 50.91%
SUBMISSION/STARTTLS 587 2d 7,849,434 3,378,009 43.03%
Total SSL/TLS scans 36d 124,315,268 56,463,736 45.42%
TABLE III: Scanned SSL/TLS hosts for our ground truth data set.
All measurements were carried out in July, 2015.
On total, we tried to open connections to 124,315,268
individual ports. For successful SSL/TLS handshakes, we
downloaded the certificate and extracted the public key. Note
that we only consider keys that were unique across the whole
dataset. This precaution eliminates the risk of falsely legitimiz-
ing events imposed by default certificates. Such certificates
often ship with popular web server software or with SSL/TLS-
enabled devices, and could thus be presented by an attacker
as well. We relax this condition only where the same key
is presented by a single host for multiple protocols. This
finally yields a total of 12,800,474 available keys, which were
presented by a total of 8,402,023 different hosts.
C. Applicability
Our approach works best for the assessment of subprefix
hijacking alarms. Attacks that build upon the manipulation of
AS paths, like AS hijacking, for instance, can be assessed with
HEAP as well. Due to a general lack of initially suspicious
input events, however, we exclude this kind of attack from our
analysis.
Ordinary prefix hijacking attacks, and MOAS conflicts
respectively, impose limitations to our SSL/TLS filter, since we
cannot assure that measurements reach a supposedly hijacked
network. With the Internet decomposing into two disjoint parts
as discussed in Subsection II-B3, our SSL/TLS scans might
reach either part, which prevents reliable conclusions. Never-
theless, we can deactivate the SSL/TLS filter for such cases.
BGP-based man-in-the-middle attacks [24] are especially hard
to identify [25]. In an interception scenario, in which an
attacker is able to forward our active scans to the victim, the
SSL/TLS filter would wrongly legitimize the incident. Hence,
these attacks are left for future studies.
We acknowledge that our approach depends on external
input, thus it is arguably not a full-fledged detection system. In
our evaluation, however, we show that we arrive at remarkable
validation results even for a superset of potential alarms.
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Fig. 4: subMOAS events observed with our experiment.
V. EVALUATION
Most of the proposed detection techniques in previous work
(see Table I) do not offer publicly available interfaces yet. We
compensate for the resulting lack of real alarms by studying
common subMOAS conflicts observed in BGP. Such cases
occur numerous times per day and do not indicate attacks
per se. Although more careful heuristics should be employed
in practice to actually feed suspicious events into HEAP, we
are able to establish a base line for its validation capabilities
nonetheless. We further use HEAP to cross-check a set of
publicly reported real hijacking alarms and demonstrate its
practical usefulness in identifying false positives.
A. Experiment Setup
Our evaluation setup comprises several steps that are repeat-
edly executed. First, we obtain a full BGP table export holding
all prefixes currently present in the global routing system and
construct a binary prefix tree such that a tree node holds the
date and origin AS of an announcement. To discover emerging
subMOAS events, we obtain subsequent BGP messages and
update the binary tree accordingly. We consequently extract all
strict subMOAS events (refer to Subsection II-B4) from the
tree that newly appeared in the BGP updates. For these, we
apply our filters individually, i.e. we query our graph database
for business and resource relations, construct an event-specific
AS-level topology, and initiate SSL/TLS measurements for
affected hosts that also appear in our ground truth data set.
We then retrieve the scan results from successful SSL/TLS
handshakes and compare the cryptographic host keys with
those from our initial ground truth scan. As outlined earlier,
we need to ensure that our scans actually reached a targeted
prefix, since our BGP view, respectively the subMOAS events,
might be outdated at the time of observation. Thus, we re-
evaluate the aforementioned BGP update messages and discard
previous scan results for which a subMOAS event changed or
vanished during a scan. Note that we accordingly sanitize the
data in our ground truth, too, to ensure that no initially scanned
SSL/TLS hosts were affected by subMOAS events. This led
to the removal of 2,732 hosts.
For the following evaluation, we utilized publicly available
BGP data from RouteViews Oregon [26], which provides
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Fig. 5: Distribution of subMOAS reoccurrences (CCDF).
total in %
All subMOAS events 14,050 100.0%
IRR analysis 5,699 40.56%
topology reasoning 2,328 16.57%
SSL/TLS scans 2,639 18.78%
Legitimate events (cum.) 7,998 56.93%
TABLE IV: Overview of HEAP results (combined).
BGP tables every two hours. As a consequence, we cannot
recognize shorter-lived events. This is no inherent limitation:
In productive environments, HEAP can be interfaced with a
live stream of BGP data, e.g. directly obtained from BGP
routers or from services like BGPmon [27].
B. Overall Results
Figure 4 shows the frequency of subMOAS events observed
during the month of August, 2015. On average, we encoun-
tered 88 events every two hours. The minimum number is
1, the maximum number is 388. Figure 5 gives details on
subMOAS events that occurred more than once, i.e. concerned
the same prefixes and ASes. On average, subMOASes recurred
2.2 times, with a maximum of 169 reoccurrences. In the
following, multiple occurences of identical subMOAS events
are considered only once.
During our experiments, we observed a total of 14,050
unique subMOAS events. Our data sources cover 11,222,
i.e. 79.87% of these events. Hence, our coverage can still
be increased, which suggests that extending HEAP by addi-
tional filters can further improve our legitimization results.
By feeding the subMOAS events into HEAP, we were able to
legitimize 56.93%. Table IV presents an overview of individual
filter results. Note that an event might be legitimized by
multiple filters: in total, we obtain 10,666 legitimate events,
which amount to 7,998 distinct cases. At the same time,
5,653 of these cases were legitimized by only a single filter,
i.e. each filter contributes unique results. The IRR analysis
yields 3,660 unique legitimized cases, followed by SSL/TLS
scans with 1,244 cases and our topology reasoning with 749
cases. Overall, we are able to legitimize more than half of all
All subMOAS events: 14,050 AfriNIC APNIC ARIN LACNIC RIPE
total in % total in % total in % total in % total in %
Covered subMOAS events 340 2.42% 2,020 14.38% 5,284 37.61% 574 4.09% 3,312 23.57%
valid business relationships 63 0.45% 1,042 7.42% 970 6.90% n/a n/a 1,677 11.94%
valid resource holdership 104 0.74% 1,298 9.24% 1,800 12.81% n/a n/a 1,971 14.03%
Legitimate events (cum.) 104 0.74% 1,397 9.94% 2,018 14.36% n/a n/a 2,452 17.45%
TABLE V: Overview of HEAP results (IRR filter).
subMOAS events. We will see later on that HEAP performs
even better under more realistic conditions, i.e. for alarms
relating to networks that are of high value for an attacker.
C. In-depth Analysis of the IRR Filter
With the help of the five IRR databases—provided by
AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, and RIPE—we can le-
gitimize 40.56% of all subMOAS events observed during our
analysis period in August, 2015. We identified 5,971 legitimate
causes for 11,530 covered events, i.e. for cases where the
affected IP prefixes and ASes were registered in one of the
IRR databases. Note that some of these resources are registered
in multiple databases. Overall, we legitimize a total of 5,699
distinct cases out of 10,500 covered unique events.
Table V shows details on the effectiveness of individual IRR
filters at eliminating benign subMOAS events. The highest
coverage of events is provided by ARIN (37.61%), while
AfriNIC and LACNIC cover less than 5%. At the same time,
the ARIN filter legitimizes a comparatively low fraction of its
covered events due to missing maintainer and RPSL informa-
tion in the respective IRR data model. In absolute terms, RIPE,
ARIN, and APNIC yield the highest number of legitimized
events. LACNIC removes all privacy-related information from
its IRR database snapshots. As a consequence, none of its
covered subMOAS events can be legitimized.
Table II already suggested that filters based on org, im-
port, and maintained_by relations, i.e. filters utilizing
ORGANIZATION, ROUTE and MNTNER objects, show the
potential to perform best due to rich relations between these
resource objects. Our results confirm this assumption. The
most effective filters are based on ORGANIZATION objects in
the ARIN database (11.86%), followed by ROUTE objects in
the RIPE database (11.17%). Where applicable, maintainer re-
lations are highly effective as well (up to 8.31%). Interestingly,
filters that are based on a combination of ORGANIZATION
and MNTNER objects contribute least to the overall validation
results (0.99% at most). In total, filter rules that aim at
identifying business relationships can eliminate 25.17% of
all events, while rules that establish confirmation of resource
holdership yield 36.39% legitimate events. If we combine
them, we find that 40.56% of all subMOAS events (or 54.28%
of all covered events) can be legitimized.
D. In-depth Analysis of the SSL/TLS Filter
It is worthwile to study the performance of our SSL/TLS
filter in more detail. Table VI shows further information about
scans to individual ground truth hosts. In total, we scanned
total in %
SSL/TLS scans 95,486 100.0%
same SSL/TLS key 45,572 47.73%
different SSL/TLS key 13,202 13.83%
no response (port closed) 19,119 20.02%
discarded scan results 17,593 18.42%
TABLE VI: Overview of HEAP results (SSL/TLS filter).
95,486 SSL/TLS hosts distributed over 3,236 (23.03%) sub-
MOAS events. Note that we discarded 18.42% of the scan
results, for which the subMOAS events changed or vanished
during the scans. Another 20.02% of our ground truth hosts
did not respond to the validation scans. Overall, 47.73% of
the retrieved SSL/TLS keys did not change, leading to a total
of 2,639 (18.78%) legitimized subMOAS events.
Despite the comparatively high number of unusable scan
results, we obtain a relative legitimization rate of 81.55%
for covered subMOAS prefixes, i.e. for such prefixes with
at least one SSL/TLS-enabled host in our ground truth data
set. To elaborate, Figure 6 shows the distribution of available
SSL/TLS hosts per subMOAS prefix. For 47.13% of all cov-
ered events, our ground truth in fact comprises more than three
available hosts. 20.65% of these events provide more than ten
hosts, and 3.37% of them even more than 100. The maximum
number of available hosts is 2,531 with an average of 29.51
hosts per event. These figures actually allow our SSL/TLS
filter to be highly robust against outages of individual hosts or
services, since it is enough for our technique to confirm that at
least one cryptographic key on any of the affected hosts inside
a prefix remains unchanged during a subMOAS event. Figure 7
further indicates that the fractions of unchanged and changing
keys shift rather slowly over the time frame of one month.
Note that despite the low decline in stable keys, we need to
occasionally renew our ground truth data set nonetheless.
Another interesting fact with respect to the legitimization
capabilities of our SSL/TLS filter is the set of ports, i.e. net-
work protocols, that contribute to the validation. Figure 8
illustrates that for more than 95% of covered subMOAS
events, respectively events with at least one SSL/TLS host
available, HTTPS servers can be utilized for the validation.
Other protocols like LDAPS, FTPS, XMPPS, and IRCS are
apparently ill-suited for our purposes. While adding robustness
against outages of HTTPS services for half of the HTTPS-
validated events (54.96%), these protocols contribute as few
as 75 (2.83%) unique legitimate events. These facts will be
taken into account for future re-scans of our ground truth.
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Fig. 6: Available SSL/TLS hosts per subMOAS event (CCDF).
Events without any such hosts are omitted.
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Fig. 8: Fraction of available SSL/TLS hosts for covered subMOAS
events, broken down by port.
E. A Practical Case Study
So far, we evaluated HEAP with respect to its legitimization
capabilities of rather general day-to-day events. To get a more
realistic view of its capabilities to identifiy false positive hi-
jacking alarms in practice, we conduct a case study as follows.
We assume that an attacker has little interest in hijacking small
and insignificant networks, since the corresponding address
space can be easily monitored and, more importantly, has no
particular reputation in terms of globally whitelisted IP ranges.
Instead, we assume that a real attacker would typically hijack
smaller parts of large and popular networks in order to launch
and sustain malicious activities. We thus evaluate HEAP with
respect to the more well-known networks. To this end, we
utilize a list of the top one million web sites provided by Alexa
Inc. [28]. For each of the domain names in this list, we perform
a reverse DNS lookup. Since multiple (sub)domains can be
hosted on a single server, we obtain a total of 522,655 distinct
IP addresses. We consequently re-assess all subMOAS events
during August, 2015 and restrict the input fed into HEAP to
those events that affect the aforementioned addresses.
We find that only a small subset of 849 distinct subMOAS
cases out of the full set of 14,050 events affect these popular
networks. At the same time, we see that the average number
Fig. 7: Fraction of validated SSL/TLS keys during our experiment.
1 10 100 1000
SSL/TLS hosts per subMOAS event (log scale)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P(
X 
>
 x
)
Fig. 9: Available SSL/TLS hosts per subMOAS event (CCDF).
Events affecting top 1 million web sites only.
of recurring events increases by 13.84%, which indicates
intentional use of the subMOAS announcements and sup-
ports arguments against misconfiguration or attacks. Hence,
one would expect to identify a larger fraction of legitimate
subMOAS events. Table VII present the results.
We see that HEAP yields a significantly higher legitimiza-
tion rate of 81.15% for subMOAS events that relate to the top
one million web sites as compared to 56.93% for all observed
events (see Table IV. A major reason for this improvement
is an increase in coverage of our methodology. The combined
filter set now covers 98.82% of the respective events compared
to 79.87% in the section before. Most notably, the performance
of our SSL/TLS filter is more than three times as high, which
is not surprising for much-frequented networks. As a matter
of fact, 73.80% of all SSL/TLS hosts in our ground truth data
set reside in the popular networks (compare Table VI and
Table VIII, but attribute to as few as 6.04% of all subMOAS
events. This finding is also reflected by Figure 9, which shows
a significant difference in the number of available SSL/TLS
hosts per subMOAS event as compared to Figure 6.
The coverage of our IRR filters changes significantly for the
Alexa-based events (see Table IX). The fraction of subMOAS
events that affect the ARIN and APNIC service region in-
total in %
All subMOAS events 849 100.0%
IRR analysis 294 34.63%
topology reasoning 146 17.20%
SSL/TLS scans 576 67.85%
Legitimate events (cum.) 689 81.15%
TABLE VII: Overview of HEAP results (combined).
Events affecting top 1 million web sites only.
total in %
SSL/TLS scans 70,464 100.0%
same SSL/TLS key 31,888 45.25%
different SSL/TLS key 6,508 9.24%
no response (port closed) 17,529 24.88%
discarded scan results 14,539 20.63%
TABLE VIII: Overview of HEAP results (SSL/TLS filter).
Events affecting top 1 million web sites only.
All subMOAS events: 849 AfriNIC APNIC ARIN LACNIC RIPE
total in % total in % total in % total in % total in %
Covered subMOAS events 6 0.71% 217 25.56% 456 53.71% 22 2.59% 139 16.37%
valid business relationships 4 0.47% 62 7.30% 16 1.89% 0 0.00% 57 6.74%
valid resource holdership 4 0.47% 121 14.25% 59 7.00% 0 0.00% 73 8.60%
Legitimate events (cum.) 4 0.47% 138 16.25% 62 7.30% 0 0.00% 98 11.54%
TABLE IX: Overview of HEAP results (IRR filter).
Events affecting top 1 million web sites only.
creases from 37.61% to 53.71%, and from 14.38% to 25.56%
respectively (compare to Table V). The remaining IRR filters,
in particular LACNIC and AfriNIC, lose part of their coverage.
Altogether, the overall coverage of subMOAS events increases
from 74.73% to 93.64%, while the overall legitimization rate
slightly decreases from 40.56% to 34.63%.
To put these results into perspective, we use our graph
database to identify the responsible registrars for all of the
top 1 million web sites, i.e. the respective databases that hold
information about corresponding Alexa IP prefixes. Most of
these prefixes are registered in the ARIN database (99.99%),
followed by RIPE (98.86%) and APNIC (90.77%). LACNIC
(2.38%) and AfriNIC (0.54%) only account for a small number
of these web sites. It is apparent that the largest part of
corresponding INETNUM objects is registered in multiple
IRR databases. Such networks often relate to several regional
subsidiaries of worldwide operating companies under indepen-
dent administrative control, which possibly explains the slight
decrease in our IRR legitimization rate in spite of an increase
in coverage.
F. Feeding Real Alarms into HEAP
With HEAP, we intend to provide a framework that enables
reliable assessment of arbitrary subprefix hijacking alarms. To
demonstrate its effectiveness, we study a set of real alarms
reported by BGPmon.net [16] during August, 2015. This set
consists of 85 highly suspicious subprefix hijacking alarms Aˆ,
each given by
Aˆ = {vpv | v ∈ ΣAS , pv ⊂ Πv}∪ {ap′v | a ∈ ΣAS , p′v ⊂ pv}.
During our evaluation, we observed a total of 61 corre-
sponding subMOAS events, for which we applied our filtering
scheme. This lower number of observed events compared to
the full set of reported alarms results from technical aspects of
our experiment design: 7 events lasted for less than two hours,
while 9 events were not classified as strict subMOAS (see
Subsection V-A). Another 8 events re-occured and were con-
sidered only once. For the remaining cases, we retroactively
IRR Topology SSL/TLS total
reported alarms: 85 analysis reasoning scans (cum.)
total in % total in % total in % total in %
covered alarms 60 70.59% 3 3.53% 1 1.18% 61 71.76%
false positives 6 7.06% 1 1.18% 0 0.00% 7 8.24%
TABLE X: HEAP cross-check of BGPmon.net hijacking alarms [16].
applied our IRR and topology-based filters, while we naturally
lack SSL/TLS measurement data from targeted scans.
Table X shows our overall legitimization results. In total, our
methodology covered 61 (71.76%) distinct alarms, of which 7
(8.24%) were explicitly identified as false positives. Note that
BGPmon.net already provides a highly focused set of alarms,
since as few as 85 (0.61%) out of the total number of 14,050
subMOAS events were reported during August, 2015. It is thus
highly suprising that these reports still contain nearly 10%
false alarms. At the same time, these findings evidence the
strength of a cross-validation with HEAP. We plan to provide
a public interface to HEAP, which accepts input alarms in the
format as specified above supplemented by timestamps of the
events. Current and future detection systems may then benefit
from our validation scheme as well.
G. Summary
With a thorough evaluation of day-to-day anomalies, we
established an encouraging base line for practical validation of
hijacking alarms: we legitimized 56.93% of these events. In
our case study, we further narrowed down the search space for
practical hijacking attacks by focusing on networks that host
the top one million web sites. Our ability to legitimize 81.15%
of corresponding events indicates that our methodology per-
forms even better for such popular networks. These networks
may be at higher risk of being attacked due to their good
reputation in whitelists. With an analysis of publicly reported
hijacking incidents, we demonstrated great practical benefits
of our system by identifying nearly 10% of the alarms as false
positives. We are thus ready to interface our system with that
of fellow researchers to receive and assess their alerts.
Based on our evaluation, we arrived at the following conclu-
sions. First, data obtained from IRR databases, albeit possibly
incomplete, is highly useful to assess hijacking alarms in prac-
tice. Second, our topology reasoning technique proves to be
of equally high effectiveness. Last, but not least, active scans
greatly support a reliable assessment of hijacking alarms. The
applicability of this approach is remarkably high, which, more
importantly, relates to a huge set of SSL/TLS-enabled hosts
that remained stable throughout our experiments. We conse-
quently encourage network operators to “opt-in” to HEAP by
simply setting up HTTPS servers with unique SSL/TLS keys
in their networks—these would be automatically found by our
ground truth scans and incorporated into HEAP—ready to be
used for validation scans in case of an alarm. In our evaluation,
we further observed striking differences in the deployment of
SSL/TLS, which led to improvements to our plans for regular
ground truth scans in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we introduced a novel approach to formalize
characteristics of Internet routing. Applied to BGP hijacking,
it is suitable to precisely formulate, classify, and evaluate dif-
ferent kinds of attacks. We utilized this model to assess impact
and traceability of subprefix hijacking attacks. A concept of
general nature, it may serve to establish a basis to address
future research questions on Internet routing.
Based on our formal attacker model, we derived HEAP, an
extensible filtering system that combines several data sources
in order to reliably assess the validity of hijacking alarms. An
automated reasoning technique for given routing anomalies,
it lends itself well to integration with state-of-the-art and
future hijacking detection systems, in particular to cross-
check and narrow down their number of false alarms. In
our evaluation, we thoroughly analyzed the applicability of
our approach, and demonstrated its usefulness in practice by
revealing a significant number of false positives in a set of
well-established hijacking reports. We intend to grow our
framework into a public service that makes its data available
on a continuous basis. We invite researchers to feed our system
with their conjectural alerts and to further extend the system
by resourceful data sources.
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